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1 The term "child sexual abuse" is a particularly expansive one, comprising all
.non-consensual sexual activity involving children. It includes all forced sexual acts,
sexual contact by an adult with a child or by a teenager with a significantly younger
child, and non-contact sexual activity such as voyeurism, exposing, and making or
showing child pornography." Lucy Berliner, Nature and Dynamics of Child Sexual
Abuse, in A JUDICIAL PRIMER ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1, 1 (Josephine Buckley & Claire
Sandt eds., 1994) [hereinafter A JUDICIAL PRIMER ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE] (citations
omitted). Ascertaining the prevalence of child sexual abuse cases, however. is par-
ticularly problematic due to the multiplicity of definitions and reporting practices
utilized by various collection authorities; no single source is viewed as definitive. See
DEBRA WHITCOMB, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD 1-3 (Nat'l Inst. of Just. 2d ed. 1992)
(indicating, for example, that varying sources define the end of the childhood period
differently and only capture statistics for a limited time period). Child sexual abuse
has recently gained considerable recognition as a serious and pervasive social prob-
lem. See ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUrION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1-
14 (1993) (explaining the historical genesis of a newly-developed public understand-
ing of the problem of child sexual abuse).
2 I use the term "mental health professionals" to refer collectively to psychiatrists.
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("MHPs") should be able to introduce hearsay statements
generated from investigative or therapeutic interviews with
children depends upon a critical examination of the Consti-
tution's Confrontation Clause? and various hearsay excep-
tions.4 The Confrontation Clause, as well as the Federal
Rules of Evidence, restrict the introduction of hearsay testi-
mony.' Despite this general distrust of hearsay statements6
and the particular difficulties associated with child wit-
nesses,7 child hearsay testimony may be the best or only evi-
dence available to a prosecutor in a criminal sexual abuse
case.8 As a result, MHPs are frequently called upon to testify
to children's hearsay statements and behaviors based on
psychologists, and clinical social workers.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him.-). The Clause was
made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas. 380
U.S. 400 (1965).
4 See discussion infra Part IV.
s See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-15 (1990) (noting that the Confrontation
Clause and hearsay rules are not coextensive: the Clause prohibits the introduction
of some out-of-court statements which would otherwise be permissible as exceptions
to hearsay prohibitions).
6 See WH1TCOMB, supra note 1, at 85 ([Ilt is impossible to determine whether or
not [hearsay statements] are trustworthy. The statements are not made under oath.
the trier of fact is not able to observe the demeanor of the declarant. and the defense
has no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.).
Research demonstrates that young children exhibit greater difficulty in recalling
events accurately. See WHrrCOMB. supra note 1. at 24-26. Yet, by the time children
are six years of age, they can separate fact from fantasy as well as adults. See Id. at
25. Multiple interviews can enhance the accuracy of children's statements, although
an interviewer's assumption of an authoritative role seems to increase children's
susceptibility to suggestion. See id. Repeating questions during an interview, how-
ever, is dangerous, given that children may believe that the interviewer is seeking a
different answer and change their response accordingly. See Lucy S. McGough &
Amye R. Warren, The All-Important Investigative Interview, JUV. & FAM. Cr. J.. 1994
No. 4, at 13, 13. Also, young children are more prone to suggestion than older chil-
dren or adults, although the age differential dissipates somewhat when 'the event in
question is understandable and interesting memories have not been weakened by
delay; the questioning concerns the central action or information rather than periph-
eral detail; [and] the interviewer is supportive rather than hostile or cold." Id.
8 See d. at 85 ([Hlearsay may be the only evidence, since child sexual abuse fre-
quently occurs in the absence of other witnesses or physical trauma to the child, and
the child may be found incompetent or otherwise unavailable as a witness."). The
constraints, however, are narrowly construed by the Court- 'while a literal Inter-
pretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court state-
ments when the decarant is unavailable, thle] Court has rejected that view as 'un-
intended and too extreme."' Wright. 497 U.S. at 814 (citing BourJally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56. 63 (1980)).
Likewise, under the authority of California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). If an al-
leged sexually abused child were to testify under adversarial cross-examination. the
child's out-of-court statement could be admitted without violating the Confrontation
Clause. See 2 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 349
(3d ed. 1997) (discussing Green).
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their interviews with such children. 9
With the backdrop of serious concerns about the reliability
of children's hearsay statements and behaviors in general," a
look at whether children's therapeutic relationships with
MHPs negatively influence the reliability of such hearsay
statements is necessary to determine the admissibility of
these professionals' testimony. An important inquiry is
whether the goals of the criminal justice system and those of
MHPs are simply too divergent to warrant the admission of
MHPs' hearsay testimony based on their therapy sessions
with alleged child victims. The criminal justice system places
a premium on the criminal defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation," to a fair trial, 2 and to a presumption of inno-
cence.' 3 The MHP, on the other hand, may assume a thera-
peutic, rather than a neutral, investigative role with respect
to an alleged victim in the same system. As the Montana Su-
preme Court noted:
A therapist does not see a child for treatment of the effects of
sexual abuse unless there has been a claim that the child has
been sexually abused. The therapist is therefore arguably pre-
disposed to conflrm what he or she has been told. We conclude
that the nature of the relationship between a therapist and a
child client has a negative impact on the trustworthiness of the
hearsay statement.
4
It is the central thesis of this Comment that the helping
values which are inherent in MHPs' therapeutic, rather than
investigative,'" role should preclude them from testifying to a
child's statements or behaviors observed during a therapeutic
relationship because such testimony may be dangerously un-
9 See, e.g., Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1989); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).0 See discussion infra Part II.
" See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of... liberty...
without due process of law.. . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIv ("No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall... deprive any person of... liberty... without due
process of law .... ).
13 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES: TEXr, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 812 n.9 (3d ed. 1996) ("[The 'presumption of In-
nocence'.., is a hallmark of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. lit) gives posi-
tive expression to the truth that the prosecutor bears the burden of persuasion on
each element of the offense, and it amounts to a symbol of freedom and respect for
human rights and dignity.").
14 State v. Harris, 808 P.2d 453, 459 (Mont. 1991).
15 MHPs serving only as forensic investigators may be able to offer limited testi-
mony, provided that sufficient precautions are taken to ensure the reliability of in-
vestigative interviews. Where such interviews are conducted in a grossly unreliable
manner, however, even if by a neutral professional, testimony concerning hearsay
statements and behaviors should be inadmissible under the Due Process Clause. It
is beyond the scope of this Comment to address the advisable substantive scope of
such testimony.
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reliable hearsay. This Comment will argue that such unreli-
able testimony would violate defendants' constitutional rights
to confrontation and a fair trial and should never be admitted
in a criminal child sexual abuse case.
Part H of this Comment examines the reliability of chil-
dren's reports of sexual abuse. Part IH analyzes the compet-
ing values of MHPs and of the criminal justice system in child
sexual abuse cases. Part IV examines when hearsay excep-
tions can be used to allow MHPs to testify about hearsay
statements from children. Part V presents my proposal both
for ensuring the reliability of MHP testimony that is based on
children's hearsay statements and behaviors, and for recon-
ciling the conflicting demands of the criminal justice system.
I. THE DEBATE CONCERNING THE RELIABILITY OF CHILDREN'S
REPORTS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE.
The reliability of children's reports of sexual abuse bears
significantly on the question of whether MHPs should be
permitted, under either the Federal Rules of Evidence or the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, to introduce
hearsay testimony based on their interviews with alleged
child victims of sexual abuse. Unbiased investigative inter-
views are crucial to enhancing the reliability of children's re-
ports of such abuse. The reliability of MHPs' interviews of
alleged sexually abused children depends on whether MHPs'
particular relationship with the child interviewee is therapeu-
tic or investigative.
The reliability of children's reports of abuse is difficult to
measure. For example, in Jeopardy in the Courtroom, Ste-
phen Ceci and Maggie Bruck painstakingly examine the mul-
tifaceted issue of the reliability of children's reports of child
sexual abuse, focusing on the difficulties encountered with
interviews of preschool-aged child witnesses.'6 They con-
clude, from their review of a wide range of research studies,
that particularly suggestive interviews may influence a child's
statements or behaviors." Ceci and Bruck paint a complex
16 See STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK. JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOI: A
SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 4 (1995). The authors offer a synopsis
of their view on children's suggestibility: "[A]Ithough we think that there are data
that highlight the potential weaknesses of children's reports. we do not think that
these data are so consistent as to categorically discredit children from testifying or
even to recommend skepticism upon hearing a child's disclosure.- Id. Interestingly.
of the child sexual abuse cases that are actually adjudicated. forty-one percent in-
volve children of preschool age, making the study of young children's experience in
the legal system particularly salienL See Id. at 36-37.
17 See Id. at 234 (noting that the assumption that bodily acts are -impervious to
Dec. 1999]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITLTIONAL LAW
picture of the credibility of children's reports of abuse, noting
that young children are not so highly suggestible that they
should always be disbelieved, but rather that such children
sometimes make false allegations of abuse. 8  Despite docu-
mented shortcomings in young children's memories,"9 it is
true that child witnesses possess some undeniable
strengths.2 0  Proper interviewing techniques- those taking
into account child witnesses' strengths and weaknesses-
should thoughtfully guard against potential problems. This
section examines the constitutional importance of the
investigative interview through which MHPs attempt the
difficult task of ascertaining whether a child has in fact been
sexually abused and discusses the distinguishing features
between reliable and unreliable investigative interviews.
distortion" by preschoolers is erroneous and that suggestive interviewing techniques
have in fact been shown in research demonstrations to generate false reports by
young children about happenings concerning their own bodies, even those with sex-
ual undertones). The authors define suggestibility as: "the degree to which the en-
coding, storage, retrieval, and reporting of events can be influenced by a range of in-
ternal and external factors [including social and cognitive factors]." Id. at 44-45.
Children are not the only groups vulnerable to suggestibility In the Interviewing pro-
cess; adults are also sometimes susceptible to suggestion and may experience dliff-
culties in memory and recall as a result. See ki at 251.
18 See id. at 1-5.
19 See id. at 76. Ceci and Bruck discuss three types of factors which they argue
impede the accuracy of fact-gathering from children:
The first concerns the general linguistic problem of obtaining detailed infor-
mation from children who are unaccustomed to providing elaborate verbal nar-
ratives about their experiences. The second concerns the cognitive problem
that arises when children are asked to recall events that happened long before
the interview; as a result, the child may have problems remembering the in-
formation. Finally, reporting information about stressful, embarrassing, or
painful events may be very difficult, especially for the young child.
Id.
20 See id. at 251 (Stating that " in response to the questions of a neutral, unbiased
interviewer, young children give very accurate reports, though they may contain few
details"). Child witnesses' strengths often receive little public attention. See Id. at x
(noting an imbalance in the documented cases that underscore the weaknesses, not
the strengths, of children's memories and stating their belief that "this imbalance
reflects the fact that much of the time children's statements are reliable and credible
and in such situations the cases are quickly settled, obviating the need for further
investigatory procedures and, hence, for documenting the child's testimony."). Ceci
and Bruck examined several flagrant cases involving grossly suggestive interviews.
They noted that even the children interviewed under such conditions, though ulti-
mately conveying reports which 'were not inviolable by the interviewers' unprofes-
sional techniques, persisted in denying abuse throughout months of weekly inter-
views, and often recanted subsequent "disclosures". See id. at 297-98. Although
children, much like adults, are likely to demonstrate a certain degree of Inconsis-
tency in recalling events, see id. at 39-46, courts should not unilaterally discard
critical testimony or reports of child witnesses simply because of these unavoidable
discrepancies.
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A. Me Constitutional Salience of the Investigative Interview
As intimated by the majority of the Supreme Court in
Idaho v. Wright , unbiased pretrial investigative interviews of
suspected sexually abused children are critical to obtaining
reliable statements that later might be repeated at trial by
MHPs as hearsay.2 For example, in a highly publicized New
Jersey case, State v. Michaels, a preschool instructor, Kelly
Michaels, was convicted of sexually abusing her students.
21 497 U.S. 805 (1990), discussed [n Lucy S. McGough & Amye R. Warren. The All-
Imp rtantInvestigative Interview. JUV. & FAM. Cr. J., 1994 No. 4. at 13. 13.
See McGough & Warren, supra note 21, at 13 (discussing Wright. 497 U.S. 805
(1990)); see also Diana Younts, Note, Evaluating and Admitting Expert Opinion Testi-
mony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions. 1991 DUKE L.J. 691. 700 (-The Idaho v.
Wright decision specifically addressed trustworthiness problems and admissibility
when a child abuse investigator testifies to a child's hearsay statements."). The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a 'statement. other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." FED R. EVID. 801(c).
625 A.2d 489 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1993) (reversing conviction). affd. 642
A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994).
2 For a full description of the suggestive interviewing techniques utilized by the
social workers who interviewed the children in Michaels. see CECI & BRUCK. supra
note 16, at 223-26. For example, Ceci and Bruck discuss an excerpt of the tran-
script of an interview of "Child B" in which the interviewer attempts to determine If
Kelly Michaels abused children at the day care center by using certain utensils to
smear peanut butter on her body. Child B was given utensils and an anatomical
doll. The excerpt reads:
Interviewer- Okay, I really need your help on this. Did you have to do any-
thing to her with this stuff?
Child: Okay. Where's the big knife at. Show me where's the big knife at.
Interviewer- Pretend this is the big knife because we don't have a big knife.
Child B: This is a big one.
Interviewer. Okay, what did you have to do with that? What did you have
to...
Child B: No... take the peanut- put the peanut butter...
Interviewer. You put what's that, what did you put there?
Child B: I putjelly right here.
Interviewer Jelly?
Child B: And I put jelly on her mouth and on the eyes.
Interviewer: You put jelly on her eyes and her vagina and her mouth?
Child B: On her back, on her socks.
Interviewer: And did you have to put anything else down there?
Child B: Right there, right here and right here and here.
Interviewer: You put peanut butter all over? And where else did you put the
peanut butter?
Child B: And jelly.
Interviewer:. And jelly?
Child B: And we squeezed orange on her.
Interviewer: And you had to squeeze an orange on her?
Child B: Put orange juice on her.
Interviewer: And did anybody--how did everybody take It off? How did she
make you take it off?
Child B: No. Lick her all up, eat her all up and lick her all up.
interviewer: You had to lick her all up?
Child B: And eat her all up.
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On appeal from the order reversing the conviction, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey held that in order to retry
Michaels, the possible prejudice created by suggestive, albeit
well-intentioned, pretrial interviewing must not have unduly,
influenced the reliability of the alleged victim's statements.
Ultimately, the prosecution decided to forego the jurisdic-
tion's required hearing on possible undue influence and de-
clined to pursue the case further, leaving Michaels finally
free, at least under the law, from her arduous six-year or-
deal.26
Extreme cases like Kelly Michaels' illustrate the constitu-
tional salience of reliable pretrial investigative interviews. If
MHPs are to testify in a criminal sexual abuse trial based on
children's statements and behaviors gleaned from investiga-
tive interviews, the reliability of such interviews should be a
key factor in determining whether the defendant's rights un-
der the Confrontation Clause are satisfied.27
B. The Difference Between Reliable and Unreliable
Investigative Interviews
The reliability of investigative interviews conducted by
MHPs should determine whether such professionals may offer
hearsay testimony based on children's statements and be-
haviors during these interviews. I contend that the Confron-
tation Clause does not permit MHPs to offer hearsay testi-
mony from unreliable investigative interviews with alleged
sexually abused children.28 This contention, however, first
requires a discussion of the characteristics of reliable and
unreliable child interviews.
Interviewer: Yeah? What did it taste like?
Child B: Yucky.
Interviewer: So she made you eat the peanut butter and jelly and the orange
juice off of the vagina too?
Child B: Yeah.
Interviewer: Was that scary or funny?
Child B: Funny, funny and scary.
Id. at 100-01.
See Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382.
26 See CECI & BRUCK, supra note 16, at 11-13. At trial, Kelly Michaels was con-
victed of one hundred fifteen counts of sexual abuse perpetrated upon 20 three-to-
five-year old children (nineteen children provided testimony) and was sentenced to a
maximum of 47 years in prison. See Michaels, 642 A.2d at 493. By the time her
conviction was reversed, Kelly Michaels had spent five years in jail. See CECI &
BRUCK, supranote 16, at 13.
27 See discussion infra Part IV (concerning the application of various hearsay ex-
cepVons and the Confrontation Clause to sexual abuse cases involving children).
See infra Part IV (discussing the Confrontation Clause as applied in sexual
abuse cases involving children).
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1. Indicators of Unreliable Investigative Interviews
Researchers caution against the use of suggestive tech-
niques which may seriously compromise the accuracy of chil-
dren's reports of sexual abuse.2 For instance, McGough and
Warren assert that the use of leading questions' may "pro-
mote greater inaccuracy" in young interviewees, despite their
potential positive effect in aiding children's recollection.
3' Re-
peating questions during a given interview session is equally
dangerous; children may think such questioning means the
interviewer is displeased with their initial answer, and may
change their response accordingly.3 Children's reports con-
cerning their experiences may also be contaminated by recur-
rent interviews, despite some researchers' suggestion that
repetition highlights recall.' Finally, the use of anatomical
dolls in the questioning of purported child sexual abuse vic-
tims may seriously hamper the reliability of children's reports
of abuse. Anatomical dolls have potential for serious mis-
use,' including misdiagnosis, which may implant false
memories in therapy and damage the reliability of MHPs' tes-
timony based upon such hearsay reports.'
See McGough &Warren. supranote 21. at 16-23.
See Sue White & Kathleen M. Quinn, Investigatonj Independence in Child Sex-
ual Abuse Evaluations: Conceptual Considerations. 16 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L
269, 271 (1988) ("In legal terms, leading is used to refer to a question in which the
answer is expected to be the information introduced n the queston.-].
31 See McGough & Warren, supra note 21, at 17. Cf. Bharti Kara & Wendy P.
Heath, Perceptions of a Child as Witness: Effects of Leading Questions and the Type
of Relationship between Child and Defendant, 80 PSYCHOL REP. 979. 983 (1997)
(concluding that mock jurors In this study -thought that the child witness was more
credible and honest in the Nonleading-questlon condition than in the Leading-
question condition.. . .).
See McGough & Warren, supra note 22. at 18.
See 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS. EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CAsES 59 (3d ed.
1997) ("Not infrequently, an interviewer must ask about something more than
once.").
WHrrCOMB, supra note 1, at 36 (indicating that an analysis and set of recom-
mendations pertaining to anatomical dolls would also pertain to the use of other
proRs, such as drawings or puppets).
See CECI & BRUCK, supra note 16, at 184 (expressing their belief that the ahId-
ity of the use of anatomical dolls has not been settled and that the APA's suggestion
that such dolls can be important tools when used by competent clinicians is too
speculative); see also Younts. supra note 22. at 707-20 (finding that studies of the
use of anatomical dolls are inconclusive in determining whether such dolls are a
valid assessment tool); cf KATHLEEN COULBORN FALLER. UNDERSTANDING CHILD SL-XUAL
MALTREAT!MENT 120 (Sage Sourcebooks for the Human Services Series No. 12. 1990)
("[Ilt is inappropriate to conclude, based solely on a child's demonstration of sexual
activities with dolls or other media, that a child has been sexually abused.).
See In re the Dependency and Neglect of C.L and RP.. 397 N.W.2d 81 (S.D.
1986) (concluding that social worker testimony regarding a child's use of anatomical
Dec. 19991
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Despite the problems associated with grossly suggestive
interviewing, it is clear that mildly suggestive and leading
questions are sometimes necessary when interviewing chil-
dren for three reasons: (1) child victims are frequently under"psychological pressure" that may engender "halting, piece-
meal disclosure;"37 (2) young children do not respond effec-
tively to free recall questions;1 and (3) child victims' "emo-
tional development and the psychologcal effects of trauma"
may impede their effective testimony. MHPs must be con-
scious of the narrow distinction between effective and im-
properly leading questions inherent in investigative interviews
with alleged victims of child sexual abuse, and must design
their questions accordingly. Proper interview techniques are
essential to maintaining defendants' rights under the Sixth
Amendment: by avoiding the aforementioned unreliable
practices, the use of proper techniques prevents the MHP
from infecting the interview with his or her personal biases.
It is not enough, however, for interviewers to focus on avoid-
ing unreliable interviews- instead, MHPs should take af-
firmative steps to encourage reliability in their interviews with
alleged victims of child sexual abuse.
2. Indicators of Reliable Investigative Interviews
In conducting effective investigations of suspected child
dolls was not prejudicial where other evidence established sexual abuse).
The concern about the efficacy of anatomical dolls for forensic and diagnostic pur-
poses stems from the inability of the existing literature to answer the following criU-
cal questions: (a) "Do abused children interact with the dolls differently than do
non-abused children?" (b) "How do normal children interact with the dolls?" (c) "How
accurately do children use dolls to report events?" CECI & BRUCK, supra note 16, at
164. Other commentators suggest, however, that it is precisely because the data are
so inconclusive, that it is too premature to suppress the use of anatomical dolls by
mental health professionals as assessment and evidentary tools. See, e.g.. Gwat-
Yong Lie & Anjanette Inman, The Use of Anatomical Dolls as Assessment and Eviden-
tiary Tools, 36 SOC. WORK 396, 399 (1991). Advocates of the use of anatomical dolls
assert that dolls enhance the interviewer's ability to accomplish the following: (1)
"[e]stablish rapport and reduce stress;" (2) "[r]educe vocabulary problems:" (3)
"[s]how what may be difficult or embarrassing to say:" (4) "[e]nhance the quality of
information;" and (5) "[elstablish competency." WHrrCOMB, supra note 1, at 34. De-
spite the seeming benefits associated with the use of anatomical dolls with allegedly
sexually abused children in a therapeutic context, the potential dangers of their use
as a diagnostic tool should lead to the restriction of their use to therapy sessions.
37 See 1 MYERS, supra note 33, at 62.
38 See id. at 67. Myers notes, however, that "[m]any interviews are genuine emer-
gencies... [and] in such circumstances the law must accommodate the stark reality
facing police officers, social workers, and other professionals who interview chil-
dren... [that] sometimes they have no choice but to ask suggestive questions). Id.
at 454.
39 Id. at 69.
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sexual abuse, interviewers should maintain "[investigatory
independence... both externally and internally through all
phases of an evaluation.... 4o According to McGough and
Warren, "insuring that a child is skillfully interviewed during
the investigation of a case is more important for the reliability
of children's testimony than revisions of the hearsay rule or
competency determinations, witness-shielding at trial and all
other proposals of the last twenty years."4' The authors sug-
gest: (1) that suspected child victims should be interviewed
as soon as possible following the alleged act(s) of abuse; (2)
that ground rules for the interview be communicated to the
child, such as that the interviewer is not more knowledgeable
about the event(s) and is relying upon the memory of the
child, and that only what is actually remembered is to be re-
ported; (3) that the child be effectively prepared for an up-
coming real interview through a practice one; (4) that re-
peated questions be averted; and, finally, (5) that interviewers
utilize "developmentally sensitive language.""2 Additionally,
Ceci and Bruck recommend that in criminal sexual abuse in-
vestigations, all interviews with children who are suspected
victims of abuse be recorded, by audio or video tape, to pre-
vent the interviewer's own biases from infecting their reports
and to aid in determining the reliability of children's state-
ments.4
A number of other suggestions may improve the investiga-
tion of child sexual abuse cases. The number of interviews to
which each alleged victim must submit should be limited."
Multi-disciplinary teams may combine the expertise of several
agencies, including the prosecutor's office, law enforcement
agencies, doctors, child advocates, and possibly therapists, to
process cases more efficiently and effectively.45 Finally, a spe-
40 See White & Quinn. supra note 30. at 269-70 C"External independence requires
that an interviewer maintain 'an objective stance of not allying himself/herself with
any particular individual involved in the investigation of the allegation.") (citation
omitted). Internal independence refers to "the evaluator's internal ability not to be
biased relative to the allegations.' Lack of internal independence Is exhibited in two
major categories: (1) the verbal content of the interview and (2) the interviewer's be-
havioral influences." Id. (citation omitted).
41 McGough & Warren, supra note 21, at 23 (citing LUCY S. MCGOUGH. CHILD
WrrNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1994)).
42 See id.
See CaCI & BRUCE, supra note 16. at 242-50.
44 ee WHrrCoMB. spra note 1. at 138-39.
45 See DAVID HECHLER. THE BATLE AND THE BACKLASH: THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
WAR 221-24, 254-55 (1988) (recommending that multi-discplinary teams should be
formed in all jurisdictions to better process child sexmal abuse cases): WHrrCOmB.
supra note 1, at 135, 138-39 (discussing the Children's Advocacy Center in Madison
County. Alabama, which consolidates interviewers so that the child may be inter-
viewed by all interested interviewers at one time and in one location: such centers
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cially-trained panel of expert validators may be selected by a
court-appointed committee to interview children who may
have been sexually abused."
Whether MHPs should be able to offer testimony (based on
children's hearsay reports of abuse ) in criminal child sexual
abuse cases under the Confrontation Clause depends in part
on whether such professionals used only proper investigative
interviewing techniques. The admissibility of such hearsay
testimony under the Confrontation Clause, however, should
also depend upon the particular role, either therapeutic or in-
vestigative, fulfilled by a given MHP in interviewing a par-
ticular child.
III. THE COMPETING ROLES AND DIVERGENT VALUES OF
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AS EVIDENCED
IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
Because child sexual abuse is so difficult to prove, MHPs
are often called upon to testify about children's reports of
abuse. A MHP's particular role, either therapeutic or investi-
gative, in a child sexual abuse case has a significant impact
upon the reliability of a child's testimony. The admission of
unreliable child testimony may lead to a defendant being de-
nied his or her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. De-
spite the potential impact that the MHP can have on defen-
dants' rights under the Confrontation Clause, MHP's are
often ignored by the courts. According to Mary Ann Mason:
The [MHP] as therapist [in child sexual abuse cases] cannot start
with the posture that the child may be intentionally lying or that
the child's testimony has been influenced by other adults. The
therapist must build a bond of trust that deals with the child's
subjective reality. The therapist must take a supportive, af-
firmative role, not a critical, investigative role.
Recognizing this inherent incompatibility between thera-
exists in 40 or more similar communities throughout the country).
46 See HECHLER, supra note 45, at 243. According to Hechler:
Such a committee might consist of criminal and family court Judges, prosecu-
tors, defense attorneys, police officers, social workers, and law guardians. The
validators themselves would not be restricted to any one profession, such as
psychologists or social workers. Physicians, for example, might also be nomi-
nated. The committee would promulgate qualifications for the position, given
due consideration to appropriate education, training, and experience in inter-
viewing children and in testifying in court.
Id. at 242.
47 Mary Ann Mason, The McMartin Case Revisited., The Conflict between Social
Work and Criminal Justice, 36 Soc. WORK 391, 393 (1991) [hereinafter Mason, The
McMartin Case Revisited].
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peutic and investigative roles is particularly relevant to de-
termining whether these professionals should be able to offer
testimony based on children's hearsay statements and be-
haviors, given the aforementioned general concerns about the
reliability of children's reports of abuse. 8 It is my position
that where a MHP engages in ongoing therapy with an alleged
child victim, the risk of unreliability is too great to allow the
admission of hearsay testimony by that professional. In
cases where a MHP engages in a reliable investigative inter-
view, however, the admission of that MHP's hearsay testi-
mony is permitted under the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment.
A. The Various Roles Fulfilled by Mental Health Professionals
and Why 7heir Testimony is Sought in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases.
Mental health professionals may become intimately in-
volved in the processing of child sexual abuse cases as re-
porters of suspected sexual abuse, evaluators or investigators
of children and families, or therapists for children and fami-
lies.49 "Even though prosecutors rely on the evaluations made
by social workers [or, correspondingly, other MHPs], the legal
world has paid surprisingly little attention to the way they
handle their investigations."
MVHPs' testimony from interviews with alleged child victims
is frequently sought in child sexual abuse cases because of
the relative paucity of available evidence in such cases. As
the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Ritchiie' recognized,
"[child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and
prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses
except the victim."  Children's role as the primary witnesses
to sex abuse creates a significant barrier to the conviction of
alleged offenders; likewise, requirements for corroborating
child witnesses' testimony and the emotional trauma that
children often battle in the courtroom pose tremendous
problems for the prosecution.sm Medical examinations also
48 See discussion supra at Part III.
49 See FALLER, supra note 35. at 79 (noting that in most states, mental health
professionals are only required to report suspected abuse to child protective services.
MHPs, however, may choose to make such a referral due to ethical concerns, but a
corresponding referral to the local police is optional.).
50 Younts, supra note 22, at 694.
5' 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
SId. at 60.
53 That children experience trauma in testifying in the courtroom Is not a unlver-
sal proposition and may depend on the circumstances and the particular child in-
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frequently fail to provide sufficient physical evidence of sexual
abuse, because the results are only "consistent with" mal-
treatment. 54
As a consequence of the formidable obstacles faced in as-
certaining whether suspected sexual abuse has occurred,
MHPs are often enlisted to bolster or to dispute the initial
findings of abuse by lesser-trained child protective workers or
law enforcement personnel.5 The specific role to be played by
a MHP, however, is the subject of considerable debate.
B. The Necessity of Bifurcating Investigators' Forensic
and Therapeutic Roles.
The inherent difficulties in proving child sexual abuse re-
quire prosecutors to often rely on MHPs' testimony based on
children's statements and behaviors indicating such abuse.
Such testimony should not, however, be blindly accepted as
admissible in criminal cases without an analysis of the role
fulfilled by the particular MHP. Where competing therapeutic
and investigative roles are fulfilled by one MHP, the roles be-
come conflated. Such role conflation may have serious dele-
terious consequences for the reliability of a child's report of
sexual abuse to a MHP acting in dual capacities. Further-
more, as Mason asserts through her social work example, a
conflict in values may exist between MHPs focused on thera-
peutic interventions with alleged child sex abuse victims, on
the one hand, and the criminal justice system on the other. 6
According to Mason, the focus of the criminal justice system
is the defendant; in social work, it is the child.
This difference in purpose can lead to conflict at several
stages during the legal process. Social work ideology and,
often, individual social workers are sometimes seen as ob-
structing the legal process. The McMartin case57 illustrates
two procedures- interviewing and videotaping- in which the
social worker's need to protect and treat the child interfered
with criminal procedure.
volved. See, e.g., 2 MYERS, supra note 8, at 3 ("Beginning in the 1980s, psychologists
studied the effect on children of testifying, and a small corpus of empirical research
exists. Based on this research, it cannot be stated conclusively that testifying is ei-
ther harmful or beneficial to sexually abused children.").
JAMES SELKIN, THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE IN THE COURTROOM 30 (2d ed. 199 1)
(citation omitted).
55 See FALLER, supra note 35. at 114.
See Mason, The McMartin Case Revisited, supra note 47, at 391.
57 See CECI & BRUCK, supra note 16, at 250 for a description of the McMartln pre-
school case.
58 Mason, The McMartin Case Revisite, supra note 47. at 391.
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In the McMartin preschool case, the jury was privy to
videotapes of social workers' interviews of the supposed vic-
rims in which improper interviewing techniques, such as
grossly leading questions, were utilized to elicit bizarre tales
of ritualistic abuse.' These videotapes may save children
from facing countless repetitive interviews or even from testi-
fying in the purportedly traumatic environment of the court-
room. Videotaping therapy sessions may also aid the thera-
pist in structuring the healing process.6' The use of
videotapes in the courtroom, however, raises "serious con-
stitutional questions" concerning the rights of the accused
under the Confrontation Clause. '  Although a number of
state legislatures have enacted statutes to provide for the
admission of videotaped testimony, such testimony's legal
status is unclear.63 What is clear, however, is that the en-
hanced clarity of electronic recordings of interviews with sus-
pected child abuse victims-whether audio or, preferably.
videotapes- acts as a check on the suggestibility of biased
reports of those interviews.r Therefore, interviews with alleg-
edly sexually abused children should be electronically re-
corded.
As an illustration of this conflict of roles, the social work-
ers who interviewed the children in the McMartin case were
responsible not only for assessing the allegations of sexual
abuse for possible criminal prosecution, but also for serving
as therapists seeking to ameliorate any trauma the children
might have suffered. According to Mason, [in attempting
to play both roles, [the social workers] interfered with the
gathering of evidence."6 Ceci and Bruck assert that based
59 See generally CECI & BRUCK. supra note 16. at 27.
60 See Mason, The McMartin Case Revisited. supra note 47. at 393.
61 Seed.
62 See d. at 394 ([videotaped interviews may hinder criminal Justice. Protecting
the child from testifying in court by videotaping interviews or depositions raises seri-
ous constitutional issues regarding the defendants right to confront and cross-
examine the witness and may unnecessarily confuse the Jury. It is also not clear
that all children need protection."). See Infra Part IV for a discussion of Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence.
See Mason, The McMartin Case Revisited supra note 47. at 393-94 (explaining
that, following Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). and Maryland v. Craig. 497 U.S.
836, 856 (1990). it is difficult to ascertain the Supreme CourCs likely position on
videotaped testimony). In Coy. 487 U.S. at 1022. the Court held that a one-way
screen in the courtroom that enabled the child witnesses to testify without having to
see the accused was unconstitutional. In Craig, 497 U.S. at 858. however, the Court
upheld the use of dosed circuit television in the courtroom to avoid the child's -seri-
ous emotional distress."
64 See generally CECI & BRUCK. supra note 16. at 238-51 (discussing memory dis-
tortion and suggestibility effects in adults).
See Mason, The McMartin Case Revsited. supra note 47. at 391.
W Id.
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upon the recently-enhanced knowledge base concerning the
suggestibility of children, it is not wise to intertwine the di-
vergent roles of therapist and forensic investigator." They
suggest that separate professionals fulfill each role.6 Ceci
and Bruck also recommend that, when therapists work with
young children suspected of having been sexually abused,
they postpone the use of suggestive interviewing techniques
that are often helpful for therapeutic purposes, such as
"fantasy inductions, imagery play, and 'memory work'" until
the child has had the opportunity to offer a sworn statement
to a forensic interviewer. A mental health therapist privy to
the first disclosure of the alleged child victim should, in rec-
ognition of her dual roles as therapist and investigator, be
prepared to offer an objective account of her therapeutic
techniques;' ° a real possibility exists that such methods "may
lead to a co-construction of events and feelings that are not
entirely reality-based"7 1 and therefore diminish the eviden-
tiary value of such disclosures by the alleged child victim.
The bifurcation of therapeutic and investigative roles, In
addition to enhancing the reliability of the investigative proc-
ess, enables therapists to concentrate upon their critical mis-
sion- to help the child- unfettered by concerns of main-
taining objectivity.7 2  Therapy is critically important
regardless of whether a court ultimately determines that a
child has been sexually abused. 3 Conflating the therapeutic
and investigative roles fulfifled by MHPs, however, may inter-
fere with the fair prosecution of alleged child sexual abusers.
In short, delineating MHPs' dual roles is significant to the en-
hancement of both the therapeutic and investigative aspects
of child sexual abuse cases.
67 See CECI & BRUCK, supra note 16, at 289-92.
68 See id
69 See id. at 289. Moreover, where a child's first disclosure is during a therapy
session, a second professional should be enlisted immediately to undertake the fo-
rensic tasks of evaluation and investigation. See Id. at 290.
70 See id. at 290.
71 Id. at 291.
72 See Mason, The McMartin Case Revisited, supra note 47, at 392 ("The social
worker as therapist.., has a different goal and different training. Concerns about
suggestibility may inhibit the therapist's need to communicate with the child. The
therapist must deal with the child's subjective reality. Pushing for the facts may be
detrimental to the process of therapy in some cases.").
73 See generally HECHLER, supra note 45, at 255 (arguing that publicly-funded
therapy should be made available to alleged child victims whether or not abuse Is
found).
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C. The Forensic Investigative Role
Even assuming that therapeutic and professional roles of
mental health professionals are properly delineated as sepa-
rate, MHPs charged with the task of validating an allegation
of abuse must engage in a decision-making process some-
what foreign to their traditional practice.74 A MHP ordinarily
does not think in such dichotomous terms, but is asked to do
so in conducting a validation assessment.75 Distinctive goals
exist in forensic practice that impact upon the validation of
sexual abuse, each of which may conflict with a MHP's other
aims.76  A MHP fulfilling a forensic role must ascertain
whether sexual abuse actually occurred, despite the inherent
difficulties in developing or proving the accuracy of such a
conclusion. 77
74 See Jon R. Conte, Has This Child Been Sexually Abused?: Dilemmas for the
Mental Health Professional Who Seeks the Answer, 19 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 54. 55
(1992).
75 See id. According to Conte:
Few other aspects of mental health practice place the professional in the posl-
tion of directly confronting, challenging, and perhaps even invalidating a cli-
ent's statements and experiences during the intake/assessment process. The
mental health professional asked to determine whether a child has been sexu-
ally abused is inherently in the position of potentially denying or questioning
the child's sense, understanding, or memory of reality.
Id. at 57.
76 See id. at 59, 63-72. Conte articulates four competing goals:
1. To help a child report events that may or may not have taken place
2. To make the process of evaluation as non-traumatic to the child and sig-
nificant others as possible
3. To develop a psychological understanding of the case that may inform the
legal processing of a case (e.g., the trier of fact)
4. To render a report that is useful to the legal processing of the case.
Id. at 59. The fourth goal itself demands the examination of three or more issues
involving the usefulness of a mental health professional's evaluation or expert opin-
ion in the legal process:
1. What is the level of training, knowledge, and expertise of the professional?
2. To what extent has the evaluation process been adequately described, em-
ployed proven processes and procedures, and made a reasonable connection
between the case facts and evaluation conclusion or expert opinion?
3. To what extent has the evaluator and the evaluation maintained objectiv-
ity?
Id. at 63, 64, 70. Benjamin Saunders cites with approval:
The tone of therapeutic work with children is acceptance, support and advo-
cacy. Investigative interviewers, while they may present to the child as warm.
empathetic, accepting, and supportive must remain objective. skeptical. and
open to all information and alternative explanations. They must pursue de-
tails, attempt to learn from the elements of the crime. gently quiz the sus-
pected victims, and refrain from advocacy. I submit that this is a very. difficult
shift for [a] CSA [child sexual abuse] therapist to make.
Benjamin E. Saunders, 6 VIOLENCE UPDATE 5. 8 (July 1993). While I would agree
with the above statement that the transition from a therapeutic role to a forensic role
is difficult for MHPs, I would argue that the task Is not insurmountable, as long as
the~professional is not asked to fulfill both roles at once.
See Conte, supra note 74, at 58-59 (explaining behaviors such as fearfulness.
Dec. 1999]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITLONAL LAW
It is the position of this Comment that MHPs may effec-
tively fulfill the role of a forensic investigator, provided that
certain steps are taken to ensure the reliability of the investi-
gative interview. MHPs' testimony will satisfy the Confronta-
tion Clause when it is based on reliable, non-therapeutic in-
terviews of suspected child sexual abuse victims.'
The noted discord between these roles has prompted one
commentator to posit that "the role conflicts between investi-
gator and therapist are so profound that mental health pro-
fessionals should avoid the investigative process altogether." "
It is my position, however, that properly-trained MHPs can
play a valuable investigative role, grounded in their extensive
expertise in the field," provided that care is taken to ensure
somatic complaints, and acting younger than one's age, although sometimes exhib-
ited by abused children, may also be indicative of generalized stress: likewise, sexu-
alized behaviors, despite their noted association with abuse, can be shown by non-
abused children).
78 As noted, the expertise of MHPs in assessing child sexual abuse is not univer-
sally recognized. For instance, MHPs have been said to "possess no significant
truth-determining abilities unique to their clinical skills and practices." Thomas M.
Homer et al., The Biases of Child Sexual Abuse Experts: Believing is Seeing, 21 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 281, 288-89 (1993). MHPs have been shown to be no better
than judges and juries in determining whether a particular set of facts proved in-
dicative of child sexual abuse. See id. at 287. Judicial caution is recommended with
respect to MHPs' expert testimony - much as lay witnesses are generally not allowed
to introduce hearsay testimony or conclusory statements, experts primary value is In
providing a richer array of facts by which the judge or jury may formulate a more
informed decision. See id. at 288-89 ("By virtue of their... technical expertise, ex-
perts may provide avenue toward facts that courts do not inherently possess ... ").
If they are unable to add value to the investigation, MHPs are no different than lay-
men on the stand. By contrast, Faller defends the expertise of MHPs by claiming
that "[tihere appears to be a fair amount of consensus among mental health profes-
sionals about both the strategy and the criteria for deciding whether a child has been
sexually victimized." FALLER, supra note 35, at 15. Despite these conflicting view-
points about MHPs' expertise, it is clear they "make judgments about sexual abuse
every day." 1 MEYERS, supra note 3. at 529.
79 Gary Melton, Doing Justice and Doing Good. Conf icts for Mental Health Profes-
sionals, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Summer/Fall 1994, at 102, 106.
80 Doris and other researchers at the Family Life Development Center at Cornell
University thoughtfully respond to Melton:
Although one may agree with Melton that role conflict Is a major cause for
concern, it can be argued that automatically ruling out the participation of
mental health professionals in the investigation of child sexual abuse would
greatly reduce the expertise available for such investigations. Training mental
health professionals to function in the strictly defined role of investigator in
many instances would be more economical than providing a police investigator
or even a CPS worker with the in-depth knowledge of child development and
the extensive background in interviewing children that Is likely to be possessed
by the child clinician. In a field in which expertise is limited in comparison to
the need, there Is much to be said for a pragmatic approach to the use and
development of resources.
John Doris et al., Training in Child Protective Services: A Commentary on the Amicus
Brief of Bruck and Ceci (1993/1995), 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLy & L. 479. 489 (1995).
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the reliability of the investigative interview.8'
This Comment asserts that MHPs can effectively engage in
an investigative role in child sexual abuse cases. What is
undoubtedly necessary, however, is proper training for MHPs
who do fulfill this role in conducting interviews,2 as well as
an enhancement of the forensic investigation process and a
refining of the investigative role.m Correspondingly, MHPs
who fulfill only an investigative role in an enhanced system
for forensic investigation may offer testimony based on the
hearsay statements and behaviors of alleged child sexual
abuse victims, without the real danger of unreliability that
exists when such professionals engage in a therapeutic rela-
tionship with children. As such, the admission of MHPs'
hearsay testimony will not trammel defendants' constitutional
rights under the Confrontation Clause.
In Part IV, this Comment examines in detail the current
doctrine under the Confrontation Clause as it relates to the
introduction of children's hearsay statements by MHPs in the
courtroom and a number of specific "firmly rooted" and spe-
cial child hearsay exceptions. It is this Comment's view that
if MHPs are to be called upon to testify to children's hearsay
statements and behaviors suggesting child abuse, any analy-
sis under the hearsay doctrine cannot ignore the danger of
unreliable reports of sexual abuse where investigative inter-
views are conducted improperly, nor deny the incompatibility
of the therapeutic role with the generation of reliable child re-
ports of abuse.
IV. HEARSAY TESTIMONY - THE INTRODUCTION OF CHILDREN'S
HEARSAY BY MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN COURT
An examination of the application of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence to child sexual abuse cases is useful in under-
standing how prosecutors have sought to gain the admission
of MVHPs' testimony based on children's hearsay statements
and in critically assessing when admission of such testimony
should be permitted. Of particular salience in this inquiry is
the Supreme Court's reliability requirement for the admission
of hearsay testimony under the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment, first articulated in Ohio v. Roberts.' The
81 See discussion supra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part VA2.
See discussion infra Part VA4.
84 See 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, the Supreme Court first delineated a two-
prong standard designed for the purpose of ascertaining the admissibility of an out-
of-court statement given the limited stipulations of the Confrontation Clause. First.
the prosecution must either -produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of. the de-
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Court has later interpreted the Roberts reliability requirement
to mean that where a hearsay statement fits under a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception, it is considered sufficiently reliable
by default, whereas if the out-of-court statement falls outside
of such specified categories it is presumptively unreliable and
inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes and "must
be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness."8 The Court has offered little con-
crete guidance, however, in actually applying the reliability
requirement where such application is in fact mandated.
clarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." Id. at 65. Second.
where the declarant is said to be unavailable, the out-of-court statement is only to be
introduced "if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.'" Id. It is the reliability analysis
(prong 2) which is most relevant to this Comment's inquiry.
Roberts' production requirement (prong 1), on the other hand, has become less
significant over time. Subsequent to Roberts, the Court curtailed the application of
the production requirement (prong 1) somewhat in United States v. Inadl, finding
that it does not apply when a prosecutor seeks to introduce hearsay statements that
fall under the rubric of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator ex-
ception. See 475 U.S. 387 (1986); see also 2 MYERS, supra note 8. at 394. Likewise.
Myers surmises that the Court's decision in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992),
means that the unavailability analysis, or the production requirement, is only appli-
cable when the hearsay statements sought to be admitted were made during an ear-
lier judicial proceeding. See ic. at 395. In other cases, the evidence must be ex-
cluded absent a showing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Roberts,
448 U.S. at 66. The White Court also declined to hold that this requirement be ap-
plied to the excited utterance and medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay excep-
tions. See White, 502 U.S. at 354. Other courts have interpreted the Confrontation
Clause as requiring the production of hearsay declarants only where the exception
sought is not firmly rooted. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 472 S.E.2d 74, 78 (Ga. 1996)
("[S]hould the hearsay evidence not fall within a firmly rooted exception, the unavail-
ability of the hearsay declarant must be established.").
The White Court left open the question whether residual and special child
abuse exceptions demand a showing of unavailability. See Josephine A. Buckley et
al., Key Evidentiary issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in A JUDICIAL PRIMER ON
CHILD SExUAL ABUSE 63, 85 (Josephine Buckley & Claire Sandt eds., 1994). A num-
ber of the special child hearsay exceptions passed by states do require a finding of
unavailability if the child does not testify, although seven such statutes do not. See
id. Residual exceptions do not require a demonstration of unavailability. See Id.
It is clear from the Court's opinion in Roberts, that when the production re-
quirement is germane, it necessitates a bonafide effort on the part of the prosecutor
to ensure that the statement's declarant is physically present for trial. See 2 MYERS,
supra note 3, at 396 n.1262 (discussing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), Man-
cussi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) and United States v. Ortlz, 35 M.J. 391, 393-94
(C.M.A. 1992)). The White decision, however, is not likely to dramatically effect the
real-world practice of prosecutors or defense attorneys. Prosecutors generally prefer
to have a child witness testify and White does not preclude the testimony of an avail-
able child. See Buckley et al., supra, at 85.
16 See Bourjally v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1986) (defining a firmly-
rooted hearsay exception as one in which hearsay is usually reliable).
8 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
87 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990) (stating without further clarifica-
tion that procedural safeguards "may in many instances be... unnecessary to a
determination whether a given statement is sufficiently trustworthy for Confronta-
tion Clause purposes").
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Moreover, despite the Court's apparent acknowledgment of
the significance of the investigative interview in Wright,3 it
has not examined how the particular roles fulfilled by MHPs
are likely to impact the reliability of their hearsay testimony
based on interviews with children.
Traditional hearsay exceptions, as well as residual and
state "tender years" hearsay exceptions, are commonly in-
yoked in an attempt to gain admission of MHPs' testimony
based on the hearsay statements and behaviors of alleged
child victims of sexual abuse.m The traditional hearsay ex-
ceptions that are most frequently invoked with success in
sexual assault cases are statements for the purpose of medi-
cal diagnosis or treatment and excited utterances. The
meaning of each exception, however, has been inappropri-
ately stretched when applied to admit hearsay testimony by
MHPs in child sexual abuse cases.9 Alternatively, sometimes
a federal or state residual hearsay exception is invoked, as
exemplified by Federal Rule of Evidence 807,"' although such
an exception is often criticized as being extremely vague and
over-broad, inviting misapplication in child sexual abuse
cases.' Finally, recognizing the unique difficulties in child
sexual abuse prosecutions and the imperfections inherent in
traditional and residual hearsay exceptions, many states
have chosen to include a reliability analysis in their own spe-
cialized hearsay exceptions.9
8 See i&.
In addition, a child's out-of-court statement might also be admitted as non-
hearsay if found to be a consistent statement made in order to defend the witness
against recent or false accusatioons that seek to weaken that witness' credibility.
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150. 167 (1995).
90 See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Smith, 586 A.2d 957. 964 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(holding that hearsay exceptions were improperly allowed to buttress child's Incon-
sistent testimony).
91 The Rule reads as follows:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay
rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of
material fact; (B) the statement Is more probative on the point for which It Is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through rea-
sonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement Into evidence ....
FED. R. EVID. 807.
See WHrrCOMB, supra note 1, at 85.
See id. app. at 91 tbl.4 (examining state hearsay exceptions). For a complete
chart of the state exceptions, see 2 PAUL DEROHANNESIAN 11. SEXUAL ASSAULT TRIALS
1031 app. (1998). Many state statutes encompass similar concepts with regard to
child hearsay exceptions. Washington State's statute exemplifies the basic hearsay
exceptions found in most state codes. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §9A.44.120 (West
1988). One commentator has summarized the Washington Statute:
[The] child must either testify or be unavailable, if [the) child [is) unavailable.
such [a] statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of
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It is my contention that when prosecutors seek to intro-
duce MHPs' hearsay testimony as evidence of sexual abuse in
criminal cases, courts should demand a reliability analysis,
even where the testimony might seemingly fit under the ru-
bric of one of the firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. Such a
reliability analysis should always include both a critical ex-
amination of the nature of the investigative interview as well
as an evaluation of the role(s) fulfilled by the MHP. Testi-
mony by MHPs who have engaged in a therapeutic, as op-
posed to a forensic, relationship with an alleged child victim
should not be admitted into evidence because of its potential
unreliability, regardless of the hearsay exception invoked.
A. Admission of Hearsay Via Traditional Hearsay
Exceptions- Statements Made for the Purpose of
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.
Courts in child sexual abuse cases have sometimes inap-
propriately extrapolated the hearsay exception governing
statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment 94 to statements made to MHPs in furtherance of
psychological diagnosis and/or treatment. 95 It is my view that
the firmly rooted medical diagnosis and treatment exception
should not be utilized to allow the admission of hearsay tes-
timony by MHPs based on their interviews with alleged sexu-
ally abused children, regardless of whether the MHP fulfills a
the act which is the subject of the statement. [The statute] requires the court
finding, after a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the
time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; [it] requires [that the] proponent make known to [the] adverse party
[the] intention to offer statement and particulars of statement sufficiently in
advance of [the] proceedings to provide [a] fair opportunity to prepare to meet
the statement.
2 DEROHANNESIAN, supra, at 1051 app.; see also Diane B. Lathi, Comment, Sex
Abuse, Accusations of Lies, and Videotaped Testimony: A Proposal for a Federal
Hearsay Exception in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 507, 538 (1997)
(examining the efficacy of Colorado's special "tender years" statute).
94 See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) ("Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.").
95 See, e.g. State v. Figured, 446 S.E.2d 838 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming that
the trial court properly admitted testimony of a social worker and two psychologists
under the state medical diagnosis or treatment exception , N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-I,
which adopted the language of FED. R. EVID. 803(4)); State v. Valentine, No. 71301,
1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3094 (Ohio Ct. App. July 17, 1997) (hearsay statements made
to a social worker by a child were properly admitted under 803(4)); State v. Nelson,
406 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. 1987) (finding that a psychologist could introduce a three-
year-old child's hearsay statements in the courtroom under the medical diagnosis
and treatment exception since the child viewed the psychologist as an authority fig-
ure and a provider of treatment).
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therapeutic or an investigative role. The Wright" reliability
analysis should not be circumvented by the misapplication of
the medical diagnosis or treatment exception. As discussed
in detail in Part III, therapeutic and investigative roles fulfilled
by MHPs are inherently incompatible; thus, a therapist can-
not reliably engage in forensic investigation of suspected sex-
ual abuse and should not be permitted to offer hearsay testi-
mony obtained through treatment of a child. Moreover, the
medical diagnosis or treatment exception should not be ex-
tended to allow the admission of hearsay testimony by an
MHP whose only relationship to an alleged child victim is that
of a forensic investigator and who provides no treatment of
that child. MHPs should not be granted permission to offer
expert testimony that is inapplicable to the treatment or di-
agnosis of sexual abuse under an expanded rubric of Rule
803(4).
1. The Practical Danger of Over-Extending Rule 803(4)
Considerable concern exists regarding the significant ex-
tension of the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay ex-
ception to permit admission of MHPs' hearsay testimony
based on their psychological diagnosis and/or treatment of
alleged child sex abuse victims.97 Critics of the unmitigated
expansion of the exception's scope argue that young children
may not realize that the MHP to whom they disclose informa-
tion is offering treatment.9 Moreover, the application of this
exception to psychological diagnosis and treatment could en-
compass every statement made to a MHP, potentially ren-
dering the exception meaningless.
See Idaho v. Wright. 497 U.S. 805 (1989).
97 See WHrCOMB, supra note 1. at 86.
See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257. 281 (1989) (hereinafter
Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse]; see also United States v. Siroky. 42 M.J. 707. 713
(A-F.C.M.R. 1995) (£There is scant evidence supporting any inference that [the al-
leged child victim] understood her emotional health depended on her truthful state-
ments to [her therapist]."): United States v. Quarles. 25 M.J. 761. 772-73 (N-
M.C.M.R. 1987) ("[The] record fails to demonstrate that the children knew why they
were taken to [the psychologist] or that their truthful answers to his questions were
necessary for their treatment.).
One commentator has explained the dangers of expanding the medical diagno-
sis exception to include psychological diagnosis and treatment in greater detail:
The successful prosecution of child sexual abuse cases should not be permit-
ted to distort the hearsay exception for medical diagnosis or treatment. Almost
anything is relevant to the diagnosis or treatment of psychological well being.
and far too many untrustworthy statements are relevant to preventing repeti-
tion of the abuse. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) should remain restricted to
statements pertinent to physical medical diagnosis or treatment.
Michael H. Graham, The Confrontatton Clause. the Hearsay Rule. and Child Sexual
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Robert Mosteller proposed a solution to the hearsay prob-
lem in which he endorses a limited invocation of the medical
diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception in order to curtail
the exception's unmitigated expanson.'0' He would assess
the admissibility of a child's hearsay statements to a MHP by
extrapolating the traditional rationales for introducing those
statements, such as whether (1) the statement indicates the
child's "selfish interest" in obtaining treatment; or (2) the
statement provides the evidentiary support for a mental
health expert's"°' diagnosis or treatment of the child declar-
ant. 102 In cases where a child's hearsay statement is to be
introduced under the second rationale (assuming the child is
available to testify), Mosteller recommends that before such
evidence may properly be admitted, the expert should be
mandated to testify to the relevance of the statements to the
formation of her opinion."
Mosteller's model is flawed, however, because it would
admit the unreliable hearsay testimony of a MHP having a
therapeutic relationship with an alleged child victim." Con-
trary to Mosteller, I contend that the supportive role under-
taken by a MHP involved in a therapeutic relationship with
an alleged child sexual abuse victim is wholly inconsistent
with the admission of the child's hearsay statements under
Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 529 n.26
(1988).
100 See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine
Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691.
799 [hereinafter, Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine].
101 Labeling a MHP as an expert here is significant. Under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 703, the basis of an expert's opinion may be based on "facts or data... [that
are] not... admissible in evidence," such as hearsay. As Federal Rule of Evidence
701 makes clear, a lay witness' ability to offer opinion testimony is much more lim-
Ited.
102 See Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 988, at 291. Mosteller mentions
the constitutional dangers of the exception generally:
[T]he exception for medical diagnosis or treatment is used as a way to manu-
facture and present evidence against the defendant. This is particularly true
given the broad categories of experts who may qualify, many of whom are part
of child abuse trauma teams heavily invested in enforcement of sexual abuse
laws. When the content of the statement concerns fault or identity, the chal-
lenges to the values protected by the Confrontation Clause are too great to ig-
nore. The important issues should not be avoided by simply declaring that the
entire exception under the Federal Rules model is firmly rooted.
Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine, supra note 100. at
799.
103 See Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 988, at 291. In instances in
which the child is unavailable to testify, however, Mosteller would admit the child's
hearsay statements only if they conformed to the requirements of the "selfish interest
theory", thereby demonstrating a real connection to a goal of diagnosis or treatment.
See id. at 292.
104 See Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 988, at 291.
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either rationale of this newly-expanded exception.
2. Constitutional Issues Surrounding 803(4) and
Child Hearsay Statements and Behaviors.
Constitutional concerns under the Confrontation Clause
also seriously impact the admission of child hearsay state-
ments to MHPs under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4).'05 Af-
ter the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Califomia v.
Green" that availability for cross-examination at trial suffices
under the Confrontation Clause, the Sixth Amendment may
only be a barrier to the introduction of a child's hearsay
statements in the event that a child fails to testify or is
deemed unavailable by the court.10 7 Although it is not readily
apparent whether the Court demands the production of the
child declarant for admission of hearsay statements under
any Rule 803 exception,'08 Mosteller posits that the Court
might require a showing of unavailability when mental health
experts seek to introduce hearsay statements under 803(4) as
the foundation for their diagnostic- or treatment-related
opinions.1°9 According to Mosteller, even when a child does
testify in a sexual abuse case to the satisfaction of the Con-
frontation Clause, a mental health expert should be required
to explicate how the child's hearsay statements are to be used
as the basis for her opinion and to testify to such information
before the statements' admission.'10
Mosteller's approach identifies a dangerous trend in the
case law involving Rule 803(4): MHPs serving as experts have
not been confined to offering their opinions pertinent to the
treatment or diagnosis of child sexual abuse."' He warns
that "[slimply because the expert is one who typically gives
opinions related to psychological condition and because the
105 See id. at 285-90.
106 See 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
107 See Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 988, at 286-87 (discussing
Green). Mosteller also cites United States v. Owens. 484 U.S. 554 (1988). for Its
proposition that a witness' inability to recall certain details involving her prior state-
ment would not be problematic under the Confrontation Clause. See (d.
108 For a complete analysis of the Court's availability Jurisprudence. see Mosteller.
Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 988, at 285-87.
109 See id. at 285 n.109. Mosteller notes that If an unavailability requirement must
in fact be fuifilled, a broad legislative pronouncement that trauma is inherent In
children's testimony will likely be unsuccessful. See id. at 286 n. 111: see also Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (holding that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the use
of a screen to shield the testifying child from the defendant; the preference for face-
to-face confrontation cannot be abdicated without an individualized showing of likely
trauma).
110 See Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse. supra note 988. at 291.
I See id. at 283.
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expert is competent to form an opinion relevant to some as-
pect of the case should not be sufficient reason to receive the
statement [under 803(4)]1. " 2 An expert may wrongly be per-
mitted to introduce statements concerning the identity of the
perpetrator under Rule 803(4), thereby expanding the "firmly
rooted" exception while neglecting a reliability analysis of the
identification."3  A trial court will typically permit MHPs to
introduce testimony that the professed child victim displays
symptoms consistent with past sexual abuse in order to ex-
plain away any of the child witness' potential credibility-
damaging behaviors."14  Courts have nonetheless failed to
hold that a mental health expert may usurp the jury's role in
assessing credibility directly. '5 As a result, a defendant's
right to a jury trial and to due process under the Constitution
remain protected ."
State v. Wetherbee"7 illustrates the difficulty in delineating
a bright line separating expert testimony regarding whether a
child's behavior is characteristic of abused children from an
impermissible assessment of credibility."8  The Wetherbee
112 Id.
113 See Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine. supra note
100, at 708.
114 See Mosteiler, Child SexualAbuse, supra note 988, at 283 n. 104.
15 See, e.g., State v. Wetherbee, 594 A.2d 390 (Vt. 1991) (holding that testimony
by an expert psychologist involving the believability of a three-year old child's hear-
say statements about her alleged abuse misled the jury and therefore constituted
reversible error); Allison v. State, 353 S.E.2d 805, 808 (Ga. 1987) ("The jury, having
the benefit of extensive testimony... that this child exhibited several symptoms that
are consistent with Child Sexual Abuse syndrome, was fully capable of deciding-
upon their own- whether the child infact was abused, and, If so, whether [the defen-
dant] did it."). Cf Montana v. Harris, 808 P.2d 453, 456 (Mont. 1991) ("Because [the
child's] credibility was not called into question by defendant, the District Court
committed reversible error by allowing the psychotherapist to comment directly on
his trustworthiness."). See generally Mary Ann Mason, A Judicial Dilemma: Expert
Witness Testimony in Child Sex Abuse Cases, 19 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 185 (1991)
[hereinafter, Mason, A Judicial Dilemma] (analyzing an appellate court decision in
which expert testimony regarding the characteristics of sexually abused children was
challenged).
11 See State v. David. 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4794, at *9-11 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
15, 1992) (finding that the trial court impermissibly admitted social worker's testi-
mony involving the credibility of the child witness in violation of the defendant's
rights to due process and a fair trial); State v. Whitt, 589 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991) (holding that the trial court's acceptance of expert testimony by a social
worker involving the general credibility of an abuse accusation, the credibility of the
child's accusation of abuse, and the likelihood that the abuse did in fact happen
violated the defendant's due process right to a fair trial).117 594 A.2d 390 (Vt. 199 1).
118 According to Wetherbee:
We permit mental health experts to help Jurors understand "the emotional
antecedents of the victim's conduct" so that they "may be better able to assess
the credibility of the complaining witness." There Is a danger, however, when
this "help" in understanding the symptomology of abused children in general is
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Court cautioned that the nature of the "special relationship"
between the expert psychologist and the alleged child victim
may lead to an assumption by jurors that the expert found
the child's account believable, thereby impermissibly com-
promising the defendant's constitutional rights to both due
process and a fair trial, as well as eroding her presumption of
innocence. 19
Wetherbee illustrates the necessity of bifurcating MHPs'
therapeutic and investigative roles in child sexual abuse
cases. 2° Even Mosteller's more limited suggestion to use the
medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception where the
MHP must explicitly delineate the basis for her hearsay tes-
timony and link it to psychological treatment and/or diagno-
sis12' would reduce defendant's constitutional due process
protections. Mosteller asserts that in order to preserve the
original intention of the medical diagnosis and treatment ex-
ception, an expert should only utilize the child's hearsay
statements to form the basis of an opinion directly implicat-
ing the medical treatment of that child (assuming that the
child testifies in court).'2 What Mosteller's model does not
offered by an expert who has examined the particular child victim. If the Jury
knows the psychologist has examined the victim, his or her comments are
taken in a different light.
594 A.2d at 394 (citation omitted).
119 The Wetherbee court declined to admit the child's hearsay statements as the
basis of the psychologist's opinion without specifically mentioning Rule 803(4 or a
similar exception, noting:
We have previously expressed our concern that an expert may lend an im-
proper "aura of special reliability and trushvorthiness" to a complainant's tes-
timony (citation omitted). In cases like this one, the effect of that aura can be
subtle to detect because it results, not only from the psychologist's expertise.
but also from his special relationship with the victim.
Moreover, the mental health professional's interview with the victim has
therapeutic as well as investigative goals. Emphasis is placed on establishing
a relationship with the victim, encouraging the victim to trust the mental
health professional. Throughout the interviewing process. the mental health
professional is not simply an investigator, but a sympathetic member of a
helping profession and a healer. As a result of the complex and special rela-
tionship that the expert has with the victim before the case comes to trial.
what the jury ends up seeing is... a concerned therapist who has examined
the child, believed her, and is probably currently engaged in her recovery proc-
ess.
Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted).
120 See discussion supra Part IlII.A (arguing that It is inappropriate to combine in
one person the competing roles of forensic investigator and therapist): see also Ma-
son, The McMartin Case Revisited. supra note 47. at 393 (7A social worker may be
trained to become an investigator, as might anyone else who has a basic under-
standing of child development. However, it is a questionable practice to use the
same person as both investigator and therapist.").
12! See Mosteller, Child SexualAbuse, supra note 988, at 291-94.
'2 Id. When the alleged child victim is unreliable, however, Mosteller would only
admit the child's hearsay statements of behaviors under his "selfish interest theory."
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appreciate, however, is that the testimony of a MHP, where
directly linked to the medical diagnosis or treatment of the
alleged child victim, may put an impermissible imprimatur of
credibility upon the hearsay statements of that child. A MHP
who has been in a therapeutic relationship with an alleged
child sex abuse victim should not be permitted to offer hear-
say testimony under either Rule 803(4) or any other excep-
tion. "
Where a MHP fulfills an investigative, rather than a thera-
peutic, role, her testimony must be derived from a properly
conducted interview, one that does not compromise the de-
fendant's constitutional right to due process. Expert testi-
mony from a MHP acting in a purely investigative capacity,
however, is not admissible under the medical diagnosis and
treatment exception to the hearsay rule. That exception re-
quires that the interview be in furtherance of some therapeu-
tic end.124 Moreover, when a child fails to testify and a defen-
dant's rights under the Confrontation Clause are at issue, the
logic for denying the application of the medical diagnosis and
treatment exception to MHPs' testimony applies with even
greater force.
When a child declarant does not testify, the Roberts re-
quirement that hearsay statements reflect sufficient "indicia
of reliability" in order to meet the demands of the Confronta-
tion Clause becomes particularly salient. ' The Confronta-
tion Clause demands that a hearsay statement be rightly
categorized as a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or possess
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 1 26  Professor
Mosteller asserts that where a statement is to be introduced
as the foundation for an expert opinion under an expanded
interpretation of 803(4), neither of these requirements is met;
instead, a clear nexus between the child's self treatment in-
terest and the statement must be shown.1 27 As argued above,
even assuning that a child does in fact have a demonstrated
understanding that her relationship with a therapist is in-
See id.
123 See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
,24 See FED R. EVID. 803(4); see also State v. Short, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3536. at
*7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ([The child's statements to [a social worker] were not made
for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment .... Accordingly, the statements
were not admissible under Evid. R. 803(4) as exceptions to the hearsay rule.").
125 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see supra Part IV (discussing the Rob-
erts reliability requirement); see also Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 988.
at 288-90 (stating that "when a statement is offered as substantive evidence exclu-
sively on the basis that a medical expert has relied upon it to form her opinion, the
statement is not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" as required by Roberts).
126 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-15 (1990).
127 See Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 988, at 292-93.
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tended to enhance her psychological well-being, the caregiv-
ing norms intrinsic to the therapeutic role call into question
the reliability of the expert's testimony in court. An investi-
gating MHP's testimony, albeit potentially more reliable,
would clearly on its face fall outside the rubric of the treat-
ment-based rationale of the "firmly rooted" medical diagnosis
and treatment exception and therefore would be inadmissible
under 803(4) in child sex abuse cases. There are, however,
other "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions that may appear to
allow such testimony. However, given that by definition
firmly rooted exceptions do not require a reliability analysis,
no such exception should be involved to gain the admission
of MHPs' testimony based on children's hearsay statements.
B. Excited Utterance Exception
The excited utterance exception" is sometimes applied to
hearsay testimony garnered from MHPs' interviews of alleged
child victims.'2 This "firmly rooted" exception, however,
should not allow into evidence MHPs' hearsay testimony
gleaned from either therapeutic or investigative interviews
with suspected victims. Neither investigative nor therapeutic
interviews by MHPs satisfy the necessary criteria for the ex-
cited utterance exception. Moreover, since this exception
does not include a reliability analysis of MHP testimony, its
application cannot ensure that testimony's truthfulness.
Three provisions must be satisfied to admit hearsay testi-
mony under the excited utterance exception: "(1) a suffi-
ciently startling experience suspending reflective thought, (2)
a spontaneous reaction, not one resulting from reflection or
fabrication, and (3) a statement relating to the startling expe-
rience."' 3t In the past, the exception required that the state-
ment be contemporaneous 31 with the occurrence of the event;
now, however, the key question is whether any delay enabled
the declarant to fabricate his statement.m The use of this ex-
ception in the context of child sexual abuse often proves
problematic, necessitating stretching the exception beyond its
1 See FED. R EVID. 803(2) ("A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.").
1 See, e.g., State v. Wagner. 508 N.E.2d 164. 168 (Ohio App. 1986) (deeming ad-
missible a detective's hearsay statement as to the child's effort to explain what hap-
pened to him using anatomical dolls).
130 WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 87.
131 See &d.
132 See Ud. at 87-88.
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originally-intended parameters.'3 For instance, the demon-
stration of the requisite spontaneity is frequently a significant
barrier to the use of this exception since children may be un-
aware that sexual abuse is wrong, thereby making their
comments seem offhand and indifferent.' 34 Conversely, the
child may in fact be anxious, but unwilling or unable to con-
vey her concern without sufficient questioning." Neverthe-
less, because of the unique barriers to the successful prose-
cution of child sexual abuse cases, some courts have been
willing to stretch and warp the excited utterance exception
somewhat beyond its intended parameters. 3
The excited utterance exception should not be invoked to
allow MHPs' testimony based on children's hearsay state-
ments and behaviors where MHPs and their child clients en-
gage in an ongoing therapeutic relationship. When an alleged
child victim makes a report of abuse during a therapeutic
session, this circumscribed exception is unlikely to apply, as
its "spontaneous reaction" requirement is likely unsatisfied.
Moreover, because this traditional hearsay exception does not
require a reliability analysis, the excited utterance exception
should not allow admission of hearsay testimony even where
a child's report of abuse to a purely investigative MHP is ar-
guably spontaneous.
The excited utterance exception is not, however, the final
word on the admissibility of MHP testimony in child sexual
abuse cases. The residual and state tender years exceptions'
effect on the admissibility of such testimony must be exam-
ined before the ultimate conclusion on admissibility may be
established.
C. Residual and State Tender Years Hearsay Exceptions
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to fully explore the
numerous constructions of existing state child hearsay stat-
utes and the countless permutations of viable alternatives. It
suffices to say, however, that when either a residual or a
state tender years hearsay exception is sought to be invoked
13 See iL
13 See iL
135 See id.
136 See, e.g., State v. Celestino, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 1544. at *35 (1993) ("While
we recognize the trend to liberalize the time requirements in child abuse cases be-
cause of the unique nature of children, the statements of the child in this case can-
not be admitted as excited utterances."); Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause
and Hearsay Doctrine, supra note 100, at 706 n.68 (-With children, the time period
between the exciting event and the hearsay statement Is often expanded dramati-
cally ..... ).
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by a prosecutor in a child sexual abuse case to admit the
hearsay statements of an unavailable child victim.'3 Wright
prescribes that such statements must possess "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" in order to satisfy the man-
dates of the Confrontation ClauseY3 It is my view that re-
gardless of the exact construction of a given residual or state
tender years hearsay exception, the analysis of whether an
MHP's hearsay testimony based on interviews with a sus-
pected child victim possesses particular guarantees of trust-
worthiness should be the same. Such an analysis must en-
compass a critical examination of the nature of the
investigative interview and the role- therapeutic or investi-
gative- fulfilled by the MHP in conducting the interview.
MHPs acting as therapists for children believed to have been
sexually abused cannot, by definition, offer objective, reliable
hearsay testimony.39
In Wright, the Court examined whether the out-of-court
statements of an alleged child victim in response to a doctor's
leading questions are admissible under a "residual". rather
than a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. The Court held that
137 See Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine. supra note
100, at 720-23 (discussing the availability requirement); see also Fed. R. Evid.
804(a):
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declar-
ant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's state-
ment; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been
unable to procure the declarants attendance... by process or other reason-
able means.
Mosteller also notes additional common grounds for unavailability asserted in child
sexual abuse cases, such as incompetence of the witness and the child's likely
trauma from testifying. See Mosteller. Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay
Docbtine, supra note 100. at 702-05. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed a
case in which the issue presented was the definition of psychological unavailability.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals. however. in Warren v. United States. out-
lined four relevant considerations: (1) the probability of psychological injury as a re-
sult of testifying; (2) the degree of anticipated injury; (3) the expected duration of the
injury-, (4) whether the expected psychological injury is substantially greater than the
reaction of the average victim of rape, kidnapping. or terrorist act. See 436 A-2d
821, 830 n.18 (D.C. 1981). See generally JoEllen S. McComb. Unavailability and
Admissibility: Are a Child's Out-of-Court Statements About Sexual Abuse Admlssle If
the Child Does Not Testify at Trial?, 76 KY. L. J. 531 (1987) (examining the signif-
cance of the availability requirement).
1 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805. 813 (1989).
13 MHPs acting only as forensic investigators may be able to offer such testimony.
assuming that the interviewing techniques used were reliable. See discussion supra
Part m.c.
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such statements were unreliable and could not be introduced
"because the totality of the circumstances did not indicate
that the child's statements contained [the requisite] 'particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness. ' -4O Neither corrobo-
rating evidence, 4' such as the results of a physical exam, nor
statements made by another witness, nor the opportunity for
the defendant to actually engage in the alleged abuse, were
judged to be relevant to the making of the hearsay statement
and were considered unsuitable for an assessment of reliabil-
ity. 
142
Rather than providing specific guidance in assessing the
reliability of MHPs' hearsay testimony based on children's
out-of-court statements and behaviors, the Court in Wright
stated that the "totality of circumstances" surrounding the
making of the statement should be thoroughly examined. "4 '
The relevant factors include: spontaneity, consistent repeti-
tion, the mental state of declarant, use of terminology unex-
pected of a child of similar age, and lack of motive to fabri-
cate.'" The Court's stipulation of trustworthiness should
140 Younts, supra note 22, at 701 (citation omitted) (discussing the Court's analysis
of the reliability of excerpts of some of the leading questions utilized by the doctor
and the corresponding responses offered by the allegedly abused child).
141 Although corroborating evidence is irrelevant to a showing of the "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness", see Wright, 497 U.S. at 826, special state tender
years hearsay exceptions often require corroborative evidence in addition to a dem-
onstration of the reliability of the out-of-court statement where the child does not
testify. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129(1) (1987) (noting that reliability is
assured when the child is unavailable to testify and there is corrobative evidence of
the act which is the subject of the statement).
142 See WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 93, 94, 99 (discussing Idaho v. Wright).143 This "totality of circumstances" test described by the Court in Wright did not
include corroborating evidence. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 819-22.
144 See id. at 821-22; see also WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 94 (discussing the im-
portance of Wright). Whitcomb refers to State v. Ryan. 691 P.2d 197, 205 (Wash.
1984), in which the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, prior to Wright.
enumerated several factors relevant to assessing the reliability of children's hearsay
statements in child sexual abuse cases:
1. whether there is a motive to lie
2. the general character of the declarant/child
3. whether more than one person heard the statement
4. whether the statement was spontaneous
5. the timing of the statement and the relationship between the declar-
ant/child and witness
6. the statement contains no express assertions about past fact
7. cross-examination could not show the declarant/child's lack of knowledge
8. the possibility of the declarant/child's faulty recollection is remote
9. the circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no rea-
son to suppose the declarant/child misrepresented the defendant's involve-
ment.
WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 94. At least one commentator has argued that Wright's
standard of trustworthiness for a child's hearsay statements should apply whether
or not the child is available to testify. See Younts, supra note 22, at 703-04 (dis-
cussing Idaho v. Wright).
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apply regardless of whether the child's testimony is sufficient
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment- even vigorous cross-examination may not upset the
child's version of the event(s) if her cognitive memory has
been molded in an overly-suggestive interview."5
A special tender years statute'46 may offer greater proce-
dural protections than a broader, more vague residual hear-
say exception. 47 For example, based on his analysis of ex-
isting state statutory hearsay exceptions, one commentator
has recommended a model tender years statute which classi-
fies hearsay statements according to their reliability, striking
a balance between the needs of prosecutors in child sexual
abuse cases and the constitutional rights of defendants.'" In
145 See Younts. supra note 22. at 704.
146 See, for example, Colorado's special tender years statute, which applies a hear-
say exception if-
(a) [t]he court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
safeguards of reliability; and (b) the child elther. I) Testifies at the proceed-
ings; or (I) Is unavailable as a witness and there is corroboratilve evidence of
the act which is the subject of the statement.
COLO. REv. STAT. 13-25-129(1) (1987) (emphasis added). The statute requires that a
jury instruction be issued by the court directing the jury to determine the weight and
credit to give the out-of-court statement and that "in making the determination, the
jury shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the
circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factor."
Id. (emphasis added).
147 See Clay Edwards, Note, The Reliabllbty of Out-of-Court Statements by Child Vic-
tims of Sexual Abuse: Evaluating Consistency via the Process of Disclosure. 33 U. OF
LOUIsvILLE J. OF FAM. L. 685, 691 (1995) ('Because authors of the residual exceptions
never intended to create formal class exceptions, applying the exceptions to child
hearsay statements as a group would be improper. Moreover, the nonexistence of
specific standards defining 'circumstantial guarantees of tzustworthiness' creates the
potential for judicial abuse of discretion.") (footnotes omitted).
148 See Robert G. Marks, Note, Should We Believe the People Who BelLeve the Chil-
dren?: The Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute. 32
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 246-52 (1995). Marks assesses the viability of the existing
special child hearsay exceptions, ultimately proposing his own Model Statute which
combines features of a number of existing exceptions which he finds efficacious. The
Model Statute incorporates a four-tier structure for the admission of children's hear-
say testimony, from the most reliable to the least reliable. See Id. The first tier in-
cludes the hearsay statements considered to be the 'most trustworthy." such as the
spontaneous declaration or the medical diagnosis or treatment exceptions. See Id. at
247. The second tier includes five requirements pertaining to reliability, all of which
must be satisfied:
It must (1) have been made immediately after the offense or have been accom-
panied by a delay determined by the court to be consistent with truth. (2) not
have been made in preparation for a legal proceeding, (3) have been the first
statement about the offense to a person eighteen or older other than the de-
fendant, (4) have been made prior to the defendant's arrest, and (5) not con-
cern a parent or significant other of the parent if the statement was made
when the parent or significant other of the parent was divorced, separated. or
in a similar dispute with the child's other parent or significant other of the
parenL
Id. at 250-51 (citations omitted). The third tier.
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the Model Statute, the most reliable statements, i.e. those
that fall under traditional hearsay exceptions, are admitted
even if the child does not testify, without requiring corrobo-
rative evidence. 49 The least reliable statements- those made
long after the alleged abuse- are not admitted even if the
child does testify." Although the model statute rightly un-
derscores the salience of reliability to the admission of chil-
dren's hearsay statements, several of its features pose diffi-
culties in ensuring the introduction of only trustworthy
testimony of MHPs. As discussed above, the traditional,
firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions included in Tier One would
need to be inappropriately stretched in order admit MHPs'
testimony. 5' The admission of psychological testimony un-
der the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception Is
particularly inappropriate given the questionable reliability of
testimony garnered from a professional engaged in therapy
with a child.'52 On the other hand, admission of reliable in-
vestigative MHP testimony that would otherwise satisfy the
Confrontation Clause would effectively be prevented where
the child does not testify under Tier Two's requirement.'
Commonly, the first individual to interview a child suspected
to have been sexually abused initiates the report of the
abuse.'" This person is unlikely to be a trained MHP, unless
the possible abuse is first suspected during therapy. 5
In Part V, I offer a proposal designed to address the twin
[A]ccepts any statement that satisfies all of tier two's requirements except that
the statement either was not the first statement about the offense, was made
after the defendant's arrest, or concerns a parent or a significant other of the
parent if the statement was made when the parent or significant other of the
parent was divorced, separated, or in a similar dispute with the child's other
parent or significant other of the parent .... Hearsay in tier three is admissi-
ble only if the child testifies and is subject to cross-examination at the pro-
ceeding or by means of a videotaped deposition or closed circuit television.
Corroborative evidence of the act does not help determine whether the child
was persuaded to make the accusation. Only cross-examination of the child
tests the reliability of the child's Identification of the perpetrator.
Id. at 251-52 (citations omitted). Tier Four includes the least reliable hearsay state-
ments, that is "those not made immediately after the offense or those made in prepa-
ration for a legal proceeding." See id. at 252 (articulating the suggested Model Stat-
ute). None of these statements are admissible, regardless of whether the child
declarant testifies. See id.
149 See id. at 247.
150 See id. at 252.
151 See supra Part IV.A-B for a discussion of the admission of psychological testi-
mony under the traditional hearsay exceptions.
152 See supra Part IV.A for a discussion concerning the courts' use of the medical
dia~gnosis and treatment exception to admit children's hearsay statements to MHPs.
Under this requirement, the child's testimony must be her first statement con-
cerning the alleged offense. See Marks, supra note 148, at 250-51.
154 See Mason, The McMartin Case Revisited, supra note 47, at 393.
155 See id.
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problems of the debatable reliability of children's reports of
sexual abuse, as discussed in Part II, and the conflict of in-
vestigative and therapeutic roles fulfilled by mental health
professionals, as examined in Part III. This proposal argues
that firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions are inappropriately in-
voked where lVIHPs seek to offer testimony based on chil-
dren's hearsay statements and behaviors. A residual or spe-
cial tender years hearsay exception may be properly utilized
to allow the admission of such testimony, however, provided
that a reliability analysis is conducted to safeguard the con-
stitutional rights of accused child sex offenders. The reliabil-
ity analysis must incorporate an examination of the investi-
gative process, as well as the therapeutic or investigative role
fulfilled by the MHP who wishes to offer hearsay testimony.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR ENSURING RELIABLE HEARSAY TESTIMONY
OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS BASED ON CHILDREN'S
HEARSAY STATEMENTS AND BEHAVIORS
When a mental health professional seeks to introduce an
alleged child victim's hearsay statements that have been
drawn from one or many interviews, the reliability inquiry in-
herent in Wright's "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" requirement" should not be bypassed. Thus, the invo-
cation of a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, in which such
an analysis is not required, is inappropriate. Instead, what-
ever the exact contours of the chosen residual or special child
hearsay exception, the reliability analysis under Wright
should be undertaken and should include an examination of
(1) the particular role assumed by the MHP and (2) the nature
of the investigative process.'5 7 The first inquiry is dispositive:
therapists who have an ongoing relationship with an alleged
victim, in contrast to short-term, investigating MHPs, should
not be allowed to introduce the child declarant's out-of-court
statements. A finding that the relationship between the child
declarant and the MHP was not a therapeutic one, however,
does not necessarily signal admissibility. Courts should con-
sider the second inquiry probative of trustworthiness - an
improperly conducted and particularly egregious interview,
assuming it is conducted by a neutral professional, will
automatically warrant exclusion of the hearsay statements or
15 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-15 (citing Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56.
66 (1980)).
157 The focus on the roles fulfilled by mental health professionals and the investi-
gative process is not meant to suggest that other factors are not to be considered
under Wright's totality of circumstances standard.
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behaviors. The following sections offer some specific sugges-
tions for implementing my general proposal, including: (1)
the proper delineation of forensic and therapeutic roles; (2)
improving investigative interviews; (3) the invocation of the
Due Process Clause where interviews are particularly egre-
gious; (4) enhancing the forensic investigation process and
refining the investigative role; and (5) making room for the
provision of therapy and the investigation of abuse.
A. The Proper Delineation of Forensic and Therapeutic Roles
An important step toward assuring the admissibility of re-
liable hearsay statements made to MHPs is to clearly outline
the separate roles of therapists and forensic investigators. '
Judges should use their broad power to serve as gate keepers
of the admissibility of evidence in order to absolutely prohibit
the introduction of hearsay testimony offered by a therapist
who has maintained an ongoing relationship with an alleged
child victim. 59 As the Supreme Court of Montana commented
in State v. Harris, "[iln general, the circumstances in which a
therapist hears a child's statement about sexual abuse are
not such that a hearsay statement by the therapist will pos-
sess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.""G In Har-
ris, the court would not admit hearsay testimony by a thera-
pist concerning the identity of the perpetrator or the nature of
the alleged abuse, although the expert was able to speak to
whether the particular child involved displayed general char-
acteristics of children who have been sexually abused.' 6' In
so holding, however, the Harris court failed to apply its sound
analysis concerning the inappropriateness of admitting chil-
dren's hearsay statements made to therapists to the admissi-
bility of expert testimony made by the same biased therapist.
Mental health professionals serving as forensic investiga-
15 See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychologi-
cal Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027. 2092
(1994) ("In contrast to the role of the child's therapist, it is the job of the evaluator to
look for the objective truth by collecting extensive data from all parties in the case
without concern for the psychological impact of his or her testimony on the par-
ties.").
159 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of
a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court....").
160 808 P.2d 453, 459 (Mont. 1991) (emphasis added).
161 See id. ("[We conclude that only in an extraordinary case will hearsay testimony
by a therapist concerning the ... sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness to be admissible into evidence."). Compare the analysis in Harris with that of
the Supreme Court of Vermont in Wetherbee, discussed supra, notes 1177, 1188 and
accompanying text.
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tors in child sexual abuse cases should be allowed to offer
testimony based on children's hearsay statements where
such interviews were conducted properly and their reliability
has been ensured. For instance, subsequent to Harris. the
Supreme Court of Montana in State v. Mayes'G2 drew a sensi-
ble clear line between the admissibility of a therapist's testi-
mony based on hearsay statements and behaviors garnered
from a therapeutic interview, and the permissibility of an in-
vestigating social worker's testimony concerning similar
statements and behaviors drawn from an investigative inter-
view. I6 In Mayes, two young girls ages five and three were,
according to their own admissions and the eyewitness testi-
mony of a hotel maid, sexually assaulted by their father in a
hotel room. I4 The day following the alleged incident, after a
report was made to the police, the girls were interviewed by a
social worker (and a criminal analyst)." The girls' associa-
tion with the investigators was short-lived and directed solely
at the ascertainment of evidence.'6 Distinguishing Hanis,
the court judiciously reasoned:
In State v. Harris the psychotherapist knew and treated [the al-
leged abused children] over a substantial period of time during
which the children opened up and identified the perpetrator. In
the present case the children gave their testimony, including the
identification of their father as the perpetrator, the very next
day .... In contrast to State v. Harris, in this case the children
volunteered their statements spontaneously with regard to sex-
ual knowledge without suggestiveness on the part of the inter-
viewers. We... conclude that the primary concern of State v.
Harris with regard to testimony by a treating therapist is not
present in this case and the rationale attributable to the treating
therapist is not present with regard to either of the witnesses. I
Consistent with the approach taken by the Supreme Court
of Montana in Harris and in Mayes, MHPs who have had an
ongoing therapeutic relationship with an alleged child victim
of sexual abuse, should not, under any hearsay exception, be
permitted to offer testimony based on the hearsay statements
162 825 P.2d 1196 (MonL 1992) (holding that the social worker's introduction of
hearsay testimony gained from a limited number of InvestigaUve interviews was per-
missible under Mont. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). a "catch-all exception' to the hearsay rule).
1 The Montana Supreme Court invoked the persuasive authority of State v. Ryan.
691 P.2d 197, 205 (Wash. 1984). in which the Washington Supreme Court listed the
relationship of the interviewer to the child as one of the factors indicative of the reli-
ability of the child's hearsay statements. See kL at 1203-04.
164 See i f at 1198-200.
l See icL at 1200.
166 See &d. at 1201.
17 Id. Despite its sound analysis overall, the Mayes court failed to address the
potential problem presented by the interviewers' use of anatomical dolls and draw-
ings.
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and behaviors of such children. Such testimony should be
considered per se unconstitutional because of the likely taint
caused by the therapeutic relationship. MHPs serving in an
investigative capacity, however, could be permitted to offer
such hearsay testimony, provided that certain safeguards are
implemented.
2. Improving Investigative Interviews
Effective interviewing techniques are critical in order to
ensure the reliability of children's statements.'6 Any MHP
conducting an investigative interview should be trained and
experienced in the area of child sexual abuse and in proper
interviewing techniques. Assuming that a neutral, well-
trained professional conducts the investigation, the following
suggestions may enhance the reliability of an investigative
interview. First, interviewers should establish ground rules
for the duration of the interview and develop rapport with the
child in order to enhance accurate recall.' " Additionally, in-
terviewers should use age-appropriate language and should
avoid biasing techniques, repeating questions in a given in-
terview, and recurrent questioning."7 Furthermore, although
leading questions may aid young children's recall, they
should be used sparingly, as they could compromise the ac-
curacy of children's reports of abuse.17 1 Finally, anatomical
dolls and other non-verbal aids should not be used outside
the therapeutic context because their reliability has not been
conclusively determined. 72 If these suggestions are not fol-
lowed, interviewers of alleged child sexual abuse victims may
fall prey to due process challenges.
3. Invoking the Due Process Clause in Particularly Egregious
Interviews
Where proper interview techniques are not utilized, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
MHPs' hearsay testimony. 73 One commentator has suggested
1 See discussion supra Part II.A; see also McGough & Warren, supra note 2 1, at
13 ([I]n terms both of protecting and securing reliable testimony from child wit-
nesses, all the touted trial reforms of the last two decades pale dramatically In sig-
nificance if investigative interviews are not skillfully conducted.").
169 See McGough & Warren, supra note 21, at 14-16.
170 See id. at 17-22.
171 See icL at 16-17.
1 See id. at 17; see also discussion supra at Part II.B.
173 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
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that the difficulties inherent in interviewing alleged victims of
child sexual abuse demand, for the defendant's protection.
additional scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 74 Extending due process protection
appears to balance the competing interests of the criminal
justice system: to convict individuals who are guilty of child
sexual abuse, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice for an
innocent defendant. Even the Supreme Court in Wright rec-
ognized the critical importance of achieving an untainted in-
vestigative interview, although it declined to mandate that
"witnesses who testify as to children's out-of-court state-
merits have no prior knowledge of the allegations at the time
of their interviews, use no leading questions, and videotape
their interviews," as they "are not inherent indicators of the
reliability of a child's statements."n John Myers also notes
that "[tlo make out a constitutional violation [under the Due
Process Clause], a defendant must prove that an interview
was so unnecessarily suggestive that it very likely rendered a
child's statements unreliable."1 71 Where a child's hearsay
statements are in fact found inadmissible under the Due Pro-
cess Clause, "the child may nevertheless be permitted to tes-
law .... ) (emphasis added).
174 See Clifton M. Dugas. II, Note. State of New Jersey v. Mlchaels: The Due Process
Implications Raised in Interviewing Child Witnesses, 55 LA. L. REv. 1205 (1995)
(claiming that courts should recognize that suggestive and coercive pretrial inter-
views are subject to a due process 'fairness' claim, and that courts should exclude
this evidence, especially in cases of obvious and egregious prosecutorlal abuses).
Where slight impropriety exists and sufficient evidence from other sources is avail-
able to substantiate the allegations, the reliability standard from Manson v. Bra-
thwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) may be used. See Ed. at 1222 (discussing Manson and
its "reliability" rationale that says, regardless of the suggestiveness of the nterviews.
that evidence derived from them should be admitted if it is found to be reliable).
175 WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 99 (discussing the Wright decision). Sclkin also ad-
dressed this issue:
To automatically disqualify an interviewer because he has -a preconceived Idea
of what the child should be disclosing" will, in all probability. eliminate the use
of nearly all statements made by young children to medical doctors, psycholo-
gists or social workers. That result Is certainly not required by the confronta-
tion clause ....
SELKIN, supra note 544. at 316 (quoting Idaho v. Wright. 497 U.S. 805. 818 (1989)).
176 1 MYERS, supra note 33, at 452. Myers has also argued that taint hearings, as
allowed under the Mfichaels decision, are disadvantageous:
Taint hearings have serious disadvantages .... [They) are likely to perpetu-
ate.., unwarranted skepticism .... mhey are likely to be overused ....
[Tlhere is no principled basis for confining such hearings to children ....
[E]xtending such hearings to other classes of witnesses will make it more diffi-
cult to protect society's weakest and most vulnerable citizens.
John E.B. Myers. New Era of Skepticism Regarding Children's Credibility. I PSYCHOL
PUB. POLY & L. 387, 397 (1995). Although Myers' criticisms are admittedly impor-
tant. I propose that the advantages he recognizes outweigh the disadvantages: taint
hearings will encourage the use of proper interviewing techniques. and such hear-
ings protect defendants' right to a fair trial.
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tify at trial 'if an independent basis for in-court [testimony]
can be established that is untainted by the suggestive pretrial
procedure.'"'77
4. Enhancing the Forensic Investigation Process and Refining
the Role for Mental Health Professionals
For a MHP to offer reliable testimony based on children's
hearsay statements and behaviors, improvements in the fo-
rensic investigation process and a refining of the investigative
role are necessary. Only limited guidance exists for MHPs
fulfilling their unfamiliar role as forensic investigators. 7 8 A
potential resolution to the conflict between therapeutic and
investigative roles is the adoption of a seamless, multi-
disciplinary process for investigating alleged cases of sexual
abuse, thereby enhancing cooperation between all parties in-
volved.'79 Congress expressed support for this idea in the
Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990, which advocated estab-
lishing counseling centers for "referring, interviewing, treat-
ing, and counseling child victims of sexual and serious physi-
cal abuse and neglect.""s
Some detractors from this approach, however, caution that
creating such a multidisciplinary process encourages collu-
sion between MHPs and law enforcement personnel in the
prosecution of cases, thereby unfairly disadvantaging defen-
dants and stripping them of their due process rights. 8' As-
177 1 MYERS, supra note 33, at 453 (quoting People v. Kurylczyk, 505 N.W.2d 528.
534 (Mich. 1993)). For example, exigent circumstances may warrant the use of sug-
gestive questioning to ensure the psychological well-being or physical safety of a
child. See id.
178 See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 158, at 2092-93. The authors note that
neither the Ethical Principles of Psychologists (guidelines of the American Psychologi-
cal Association) nor the Guidelines for the Clinical Evaluation of Child and Adolescent
Sexual Abuse (published by the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psy-
chiatry) provide guidance in testiying as an expert witness. See id. at 2092. Only a
joint committee of the American Psychology-Law Society and Division 41 of the
American Psychological Association promulgated relevant guidelines (Specialty
Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists) that address proper professional protocol for
forensic practice. See id. at 2092-93.
I7 See id. at 2093; Meredith Fellse Sopher, Note, "The Best of All Possible Worlds":
Balancing Victims' and Defendants' Rights in the Child Sexual Abuse Case. 63
FORDHAM L. REv. 633, 658-61 (1994) (discussing in detail the interdisciplinary ap-
proach used by some communities for the investigation of child sexual abuse).
180 WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 139 (quoting Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 13002(b)(2)(B) (1994)).
181 See Sopher, supra note 179, at 662. Few studies have examined whether
multi-disciplinary teams would benefit either the defendant or the prosecution. See
id.; see also 1 MYERS, supra note 33, at 72-76 (reviewing the limited research avail-
able concerning the use of multi-disciplinary teams for child abuse investigations,
noting that too little data Is available to indicate whether the existence of the centers
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suning, however, that roles are properly delineated (espe-
cialy those of therapists and forensic investigators), the
streamlined process is likely to enhance the reliability of a
child's report of sexual abuse, as the number of interviews is
reduced and their effectiveness enhanced.'" Training in
proper investigative techniques, which are essential to gener-
ating reliable child reports,' may also be more efficiently
provided if the agencies involved in child sexual abuse cases
cooperate.l" The streamlined forensic investigation de-
manded by the criminal justice system must, however, be ef-
fectively combined with access to needed therapeutic services
for alleged sexually abused children.
5. Making Room for the Provision of Therapy
and the Investigation of Abuse
High-quality therapeutic services must be made available
to children who are suspected victims of sexual abuse, inde-
pendent of the necessary criminal investigations of such sus-
picions. Nevertheless, a number of procedural safeguards
may serve to ensure both that allegedly abused children re-
ceive therapy and that forensic interviews of such children
remain reliable.
Even when therapists and forensic investigators play dis-
tinct roles and the investigative process is designed to im-
prove the reliability of children's reports of abuse, the effect of
mental health therapy on the reliability of children's sworn
statements may still create admissibility problems2r The
danger in such counseling is that young victims may discuss
the alleged abuse with the therapist and impair the accuracy
of future interviews"'t Ceci and Bruck's suggestion that
affects prosecution outcomes).
1 See I MYERS, supra note 33. at 72-76.
18 See fi. at 459-61.
184 See Doris et al., supra note 80, at 486-88 (discussing the Importance of inter-
agency coordination and the efficacy of multi-disciplinary teams to enhance training
in child sexual abuse assessment).
195 See 2 MYERS. supra note 8. at 333 (noting that mental health counseling before
hearsay statements are made is one factor which courts might consider In assessing
the statements' trustworthiness).
1 See f&. at 333 n.904 ("Abuse-specific therapy Is a common and accepted mode
of treatment with victims of child sexual abuse. During such therapy. the profes-
sional discusses abuse with the child."). Myers quotes the Washington Court of Ap-
peals' treatment of this problem:
We recognize that a lapse of time and intervening counseling could affect the
reliability of a child's statements regarding abuse .... "lilt Is possible that 'I 1
there is evidence of prior interrogation, prompting, or manipulation by adults.
spontaneity may be an inaccurate indicator of trustv,:orthiness.' Idaho v.
Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). However, as the Wriglht court's careful ian-
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MHPs serving as therapists refrain from using suggestive
techniques such as "fantasy inductions, imagery play, and'memory work' during therapy sessions conducted before the
completion of forensic interviews," is a sensible solution to
this conflict between abused children's need for therapy and
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
187
In addition, the bifurcation of MHPs' therapeutic and in-
vestigative roles may prevent a child's testimony from being
tainted by therapy in the period between an initial statement
to an investigating MHP and the often-delayed criminal
prosecution. Ceci and Bruck caution that therapists should
not attempt to "'crack' the case or to discover other aspects of
abuse that may be helpful to the courts," given the "basic in-
compatibility between the goals of a forensic interviewer and
those of a therapist."'8 As a possible solution, Ceci and
Bruck recommend that when a child first discloses the al-
leged abuse to a therapist, rather than a forensic investigator,
therapists should objectively report their therapeutic tech-
niques such that the investigator can evaluate whether the
therapist subjected the child to improper suggestion.8 9
Finally, empirical research shows that interviews should
be conducted as soon as possible in order to guard against
the increasing decline of the young child's memory of the
abusive event(s) before trial. 9° As a means of increasing the
level of reliability of MHPs' testimony concerning alleged child
abuse victims' statements and behaviors, Lorenzen suggests
that investigative interviews by MHPs be videotaped (or at
least audiotaped) on a routine basis. 9' Although not an in-
herent indicator of reliability, 192 video or audio recording of
guage makes clear, these factors will not affect reliability in all cases.
State v. Carlson, 812 P.2d 536, 540 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
187 CECI & BRUCK, supra note 16, at 289. According to the authors, "ip]ror to [the
completion of forensic interviews], therapy should be restricted to working on every-
day coping strategies that cannot be challenged by the defendant's counsel as cre-
ating false memories." Id.
Id. at 290. The authors note that "[t]he primary and sole role of the forensic
investigator is to collect the facts of the case. In therapy, however, there Is an em-
phasis on 'helping....." Id. Ceci and Bruck cite several professional organizations
which offer guidelines recommending that forensic and clinical roles not be fulfilled
by the same person, including the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psy-
chiatry and the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children. See Id.
189 See id. at 290-91.
190 See McGough &Warren, supra note 21, at 14.
191 See Dirk Lorenzen, Note, Special Topics in the Law of Evidence: The Admissibil-
ity of Expert Psychological Testimony in Cases Involving the Sexual Misuse of a Child,
42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1033, 1069-71 (1996) (asserting that the videotapes usually will
not need to be played in court, but will only need to be seen in the event of a dispute
about their contents).
192 See Mason, The McMartin Case Revisited, supra note 47, at 393 ("ILlegal status
of videotaped testimony is unclear" under the Constitution's Sixth Amendment).
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interviews, when combined with other noted procedural safe-
guards, can potentially play a part in ensuring the reliability
of MHPs' accounts of children's reports of sexual abuse, and
thereby dilute the problems created by a MHPs' dual role in
the case.
It is essential to note that, in the long run, abused chil-
dren will best be served by a greater commitment of extra-
judicial resources toward remedying child sexual abuse. For
now, given the unavoidable presence of child sexual abuse,
an effective, sensitive balancing of the therapeutic needs of
suspected victims and the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants must be reached.
VII. CONCLUSION
The therapeutic and investigative roles fulfilled by MHPs in
child sexual abuse cases are inherently incompatible. As
such, a therapist who forges an ongoing relationship with a
child victim should not be permitted to introduce testimony
involving the child's hearsay statements or behaviors. Such
hearsay should be considered per se unreliable; courts must
protect defendants' constitutional rights to confrontation, due
process, and the presumption of innocence when the reliabil-
ity of children's hearsay statements is at issue. Properly
trained MHPs who serve solely as investigators, however,
should be able to introduce a child's hearsay statements and
behaviors in court in order to further the prosecution of a
sexual abuse charge, provided that such MHPs conduct in-
terviews in a way conducive to the generation of reliable
statements.
When the admissibility of MHPs' testimony based on chil-
dren's hearsay statements and behaviors is at issue in a child
sexual abuse case, courts must apply the Idaho v Wright reli-
ability analysis. As a part of this analysis, courts must ex-
amine both the efficacy of the investigative process and the
role fulfilled by the MHP seeking to offer hearsay testimony in
order to ensure that defendants' constitutional rights under
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are pro-
tected. Under this analysis, neither the traditional, firmly-
rooted hearsay exceptions nor any variation of a special or re-
sidual hearsay exception justify the admission of MHPs' hear-
say testimony in cases of child sexual abuse, where the MHP
fulfills a therapeutic, as distinguished from an investigative,
role.
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